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 5 
A disposition-based process-theory 
of causation 
 Andreas Hüttemann 
 Given certain well-known observations by Mach and Russell, the question arises what 
place there is for causation in the physical world. My aim in this chapter is to understand 
under what conditions we can use causal terminology and how it fi ts in with what physics 
has to say. I will argue for a disposition-based process-theory of causation. After addressing 
Mach’s and Russell’s concerns I will start by outlining the kind of problem the disposition-
based process-theory of causation is meant to solve. In a second step I will discuss the 
nature of those dispositions that will be relevant for our question. In section 3 I will discuss 
existing dispositional accounts of causation before I proceed to present my own account 
(sections 4 to 6) and contrast it with traditional process-theories (section 7). 
 1 Problems of causation 
 There are many problems of causation. Michael Tooley and Ernest Sosa for instance 
present a list of fi ve fundamental issues: (1) the relation of causal laws and causal relations; 
(2) do causal states of aff airs logically supervene on non-causal ones? (3) if not, is an a 
posteriori reduction feasible? (4) are causal relations immediately given in experience? 
(5) do causal concepts need to be analysed, or can they be taken to be basic? ( Sosa and 
Tooley  1993 : 5). While all of these are important issues, I will not attempt to answer any 
of these—at least not directly. Rather, I will approach the issue of causation from a dif-
ferent angle. In what follows I will focus on ‘probably the central problem in the meta-
physics of causation’ ( Field  2003 : 443). 
 At the turn of the 20th century Mach and Russell suggested that the terms ‘cause’ and 
‘eff ect’ ought to be eliminated because they are imprecise and their conditions of applica-
tion inconsistent with what physics says about reality. However, causal notions play an 
important role in everyday life and in the special sciences, and, as Nancy  Cartwright 
( 1983 : 21ff ) has pointed out, they seem indispensable in order to distinguish effi  cient 
from non-effi  cient strategies. How are these observations to be reconciled? What place 
have causes and eff ects in a world as described by physics—for short: in a physical world? 
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 1.1 Historical background 
 In 1874 Gustav Kirchhoff  criticized the notion of causation in the well-known preface 
to his  Lectures on Mechanics :
 It is common to defi ne mechanics as the science of forces and forces as causes that bring about 
motions or tend to bring them about. [. . .]. [This defi nition] is tainted by an obscurity that is due 
to the notion of cause and tendency [. . .]. For this reason I propose that the aim of mechanics is 
to describe the movements that take place in nature – more specifi cally to describe them com-
pletely and as simple as possible. What I want to say is that we should aim at stating what phe-
nomena there are rather than to determine their causes. ( Kirchhoff   1874 , preface) 
 Kirchhoff ’s criticism concerns causation in a productive sense or understood as a force, 
which was indeed the main concept of cause that was used by physicists in the fi rst half 
of the 19th century. 1 Eliminating productive causes from physics still leaves room for 
other conceptions. Gustav Theodor Fechner and the early Ernst Mach for example 
turned to John Stuart Mill. Mill had repudiated productive causes and defended a regu-
larity view according to which the cause is an instance of the antecedent in a law, which 
is a suffi  cient condition for the occurrence of the eff ect:
 To certain facts certain facts always do, and, as we believe, will continue to, succeed. The invari-
able antecedent is termed the cause; the invariable consequent the eff ect. ( Mill  1843 /1891: 
213) 
 When at the turn of the century Mach and Bertrand Russell criticized the notion of 
cause it was a Millian regularity view of causation they had in mind. 
 Mach argued that for at least three reasons the concept of cause cannot be applied to 
reality as described by physics and should therefore be given up.
 (i) Taking seriously the concept of cause as a set of conditions implies that you 
need to consider every single factor on which an event depends. That is practi-
cally impossible.
 If one attempts to eliminate the traces of fetishism, which are still associated with the concept 
of cause, and takes into consideration that in general you cannot specify a cause since a phenom-
enon most of the times is determined by a whole system of conditions, you are led to the con-
clusion to give up the concept of cause altogether. ( Mach  1896 : 435–6) 
 (ii) The concept of cause requires strict regularities. However, there are no such 
regularities:
 In nature there are no causes and no eff ects. Nature is there only once. Repetitions of identical 
cases, such that A is always correlated with B, the same outcome under the same conditions, i.e. 
what’s essential for the relation between cause and eff ect, exists only in abstraction. . . ( Mach 
 1883 : 459) 
 1 See Hüttemann, ‘The Elimination of Causal vocabulary from Physics’, manuscript. 
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 (iii) Finally, the advanced sciences replace causal terminology by the concept of a 
mathematical function, which is a more precise notion.
 In the higher developed natural sciences the use of the concepts cause and eff ect becomes 
more and more limited. There is a perfectly good reason for this, namely that these concepts 
describe a state of aff airs provisionally and incompletely – they are imprecise [. . .]. As soon as it 
is possible to characterise the elements of events through measurable quantities, [. . .] the 
dependence of the elements on each other can be characterized more completely and more 
precisely through the concept of a function, rather than through the insuffi  ciently determined 
concepts cause and eff ect. ( Mach  1883 , 278) 
 Russell in his well-known paper ‘On the notion of Cause’ adds two important 
considerations:
 (iv) Causes are usually conceived as localized events (locality). However, no local-
ized event is suffi  cient for the occurrence of any other event, because there may 
always be an interfering factor.
 In order to be sure of the expected eff ect, we must know that there is nothing in the environ-
ment to interfere with it. But this means that the supposed cause is not, by itself, adequate to 
insure the eff ect. And as soon as we include the environment, the probability of repetition is 
diminished, until at last, when the whole environment is included, the probability becomes  nil . 
( Russell  1912 –13, 7–8) 
 Thus, if the fact that causes determine their eff ects is spelled out in terms of conditional 
regularities such that the cause is the antecedent, we cannot have both locality and 
determination.
 (v) In a physical system as described by fundamental physics, the future determines 
the past in exactly the same way as vice versa.
 . . .the future ‘determines’ the past in exactly the same sense in which the past ‘determines’ 
the future. The word ‘determine’, here, has a purely logical signifi cance: a certain number 
of variables ‘determine’ another variable if that variable is a function of them. ( Russell 
 1912 –13: 15) 
 Therefore, the asymmetry which we associate with the causal relation is inconsistent 
with fundamental physics. 
 Mach and Russell both conclude that there is no place for causation in the advanced 
sciences. Even though this latter claim has been proven false for today’s advanced sci-
ences, 2 the issue has been raised of how to reconcile Mach’s and Russell’s observations 
with the persistence and usefulness of causal terminology. 
 2 See, for instance ( Suppes  1970 : 5–6), ( Hitchcock  2007 : 55), and ( Williamson  2009 : 195–7). 
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 1.2 The folk-conception of causation 
 As others have observed ( Norton  2007 ), there is probably no univocal conception 
of causation as we usually (pre-theoretically) understand it, let alone a conception 
that furthermore applies to the special sciences. What people mean by causation 
has probably changed over time and even within historical periods of time there 
might be different conceptions. Be that as it may, I will present some features that 
are often associated with causation in everyday life as well as in the special sciences, 
and will ask to what extent a relation that has these features has its place in a physi-
cal world.
 •  Modal Force : A cause brings about the eff ect. It somehow  forces the eff ect to occur. 
The cause determines the eff ect to occur. 
 •  Asymmetry : Causes bring about eff ects, but not vice versa. 
 •  Time - Precedence : Causes precede their eff ects. 
 •  Locality : Causes and eff ects are events that can be localized in spacetime, in some 
defi nite kind of region. 
 •  Dominant Cause : There is a distinction between a main cause and secondary fac-
tors (between causes and conditions). 
 •  Objectivity : Whether or not something is a cause is independent of human interests 
or convictions. 
 •  Multi-level : Causal relations obtain on all kinds of ‘levels’: in physics, the special 
sciences in everyday life. 3 
 As we have seen, some of these characteristics are somewhat problematic in the light 
of the early 20th-century criticism. In what follows, I will focus on the problem of 
modal force, and occasionally mention how I think the other features might be dealt 
with. I will not have anything to say about the problem of the asymmetry of the 
causal relation, but assume that an account can be given that explains this feature in 
terms of statistical mechanics somewhere along the lines of  Albert ( 2000 ) or  Field 
( 2003 , section 4). 
 In what follows I will argue that, even though causation in the above-mentioned 
sense probably has no place in a physical world, a near relative can be shown to be com-
patible with physics—at least given the right conditions. That will allow us to under-
stand why and under what conditions we are successfully applying causal terminology. I 
take it that the relation between causes and eff ects does not describe  sui generis facts over 
and above those described by the various sciences. Causal facts—I will argue—are partly 
determined by the facts of physics, biology, economics, etc., but they are also partly 
determined by pragmatic considerations. 
 3 Some of these characteristics are mentioned in ( Norton  2007 ).  Modal Force and  Asymmetry have been 
called the hard problems of a theory of causation ( Hitchcock  2007 : 58). 
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 2 Laws and dispositions 
 One of the central claims I will argue for is that we need to understand the roles of dis-
positions for physical laws. This then allows us to understand how causal relations emerge 
from compound systems given the right kind of conditions (as well as certain pragmatic 
considerations that I will talk about towards the end). 
 Law, disposition, and causation are closely related concepts. All three are concerned 
with some kind of natural necessity. The cause  forces the eff ect to occur. Given a disposi-
tion and the right circumstances the disposition  cannot but manifest, and the law  forces or 
 necessitates bodies to behave in some way rather than another. Furthermore, all three 
notions are closely tied to counterfactual conditionals. Laws support counterfactuals, 
causal relations can often be spelled out in terms of counterfactual claims, and the con-
ditional analysis of disposition is at least a helpful device for the explication of disposi-
tional properties. It thus seems to be reasonable to see how laws, dispositions, and 
causation are in fact related so as to give a unifi ed account of these concepts and maybe 
of the kind of natural necessity involved. 4 
 I will argue that at least most laws of nature are grounded in dispositions. Given a 
detailed understanding of these dispositions, we will also be able to understand how 
causal relations fi t into a physical world. 
 2.1 Part–whole explanation 
 In this section I will explain why it is reasonable to assume that physical systems have 
dispositions and how to understand these dispositions. 
 I will argue that we need to assume that physical systems have dispositional properties 
because this assumption provides the best explanation for the way physics treats com-
pound systems and their parts. 
 Let me start with an example of a part–whole explanation from quantum mechanics: 
carbon monoxide molecules consist of two atoms of mass m 
1
 and m 
2
 at a distance x. 
Besides vibrations along the x-axis, the atoms can perform rotations in three-dimen-
sional space around its centre of mass. This provides the motivation for describing the 
molecule as a rotating oscillator, rather than as a simple harmonic oscillator. The com-
pound’s (the molecule’s) behaviour is explained in terms of the behaviour of two sub-
systems, the oscillator and the rotator. In this case the parts are not spatial parts, they are 
sets of degrees of freedom. The physicist Arno Bohm, who discusses this example in his 
textbook on quantum mechanics, describes this procedure as follows:
 We shall therefore fi rst study the rigid-rotator model by itself. This will provide us with a 
description of the CO states that are characterised by the quantum number n = 0, and will also 
approximately describe each set of states with a given vibrational quantum number n. Then we 
shall see how these two models [The harmonic oscillator has already been discussed in a  previous 
 4 For a discussion of these connections see ( Handfi eld  2009 : 4) and ( McKitrick  2009 : 31). 
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chapter. A.H.] are combined to form the vibrating rotator or the rotating vibrator ( Bohm  1986 : 
128). 
 Thus, the fi rst step consists in considering how each subsystem behaves if considered as 
an isolated system. The second step consists in combining the two systems. 
 This is a perfect illustration of a quantum-mechanical part–whole explanation. 
In carrying out this programme Bohm considers the following subsystems: (i) a 
rotator, which can be described by the Schrödinger equation with the Hamiltonian: 
 H 
rot
 =  L 2 /2I, where  L is the angular momentum operator and I the moment of iner-
tia; (ii) an oscillator, which can be described by the Schrödinger equation with the 
following Hamiltonian:  H 
osc
 =  P 2 /2μ + μω 2 Q 2 /2, where  P is the momentum opera-
tor,  Q the position operator, ω the frequency of the oscillating entity and μ the 
reduced mass. 
 He adds up the contributions of the subsystem by invoking a law of composition (for 
short: COMP):
 IVa. Let one physical system be described by an algebra of operators, A 
1
 , in the space  R 
1
 , and the 
other physical system by an algebra A 
2
 in  R 
2
 . The direct-product space  R 
1
  R 
2
 is then the space 
of physical states of the physical combinations of these two systems, and its observables are 
operators in the direct-product space. The particular observables of the fi rst system alone are 
given by A 
1
 I, and the observables of the second system alone are given by I A 
2
 (I = identity 
operator). ( Bohm  1986 : 147) 
 Thus, four laws are involved in this part–whole explanation:
 (1) The law for the compound: The compound behaves according to the 
Schrödinger-equation with the Hamiltonian  H 
comp
 =  H 
rot
 +  H 
osc
 . (This is the 
 explanandum ; it describes the behaviour of the compound.) 
 (2) The law for the rotator: The rotator behaves according to the Schrödinger equa-
tion with the Hamiltonian:  H 
rot
 =  L 2 /2I. 
 (3) The law for the oscillator: The oscillator behaves according to the Schrödinger 
equation with the Hamiltonian:  H 
osc
 =  P 2 /2μ + μω 2 Q 2 /2. 
 (4) The law of composition (COMP) that tells us how to combine (2) and (3). 
 We explain the behaviour of the compound (the  explanandum ) as described in (1) in 
terms of (2), (3), and (4) (the  explanans ). 
 The solar system provides another example of a part–whole explanation. Even in 
the case of a highly integrated system as the solar system, you make the same steps. In 
the dynamic equations for the solar system (Lagrange-equation) you write the terms 
for the kinetic energy of the planets, etc. (that’s the term that describes how the part 
would behave if it were on its own). You then combine these subsystems, i.e. you 
describe them by a single Hamilton function or operator. The only signifi cant diff er-
ence to the case above is that you need to add gravitational interaction terms. As in the 
case above, we rely on laws of composition, namely laws that tell us how to add up the 
various contributions. 
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 Let me add as a fi nal example of a compound system a falling stone in a medium. The 
subsystems are the freely falling stone on the one hand and the medium on the other. 
Both contribute to the overall behaviour. 
 2.2 An argument for dispositions 
 In this section I will argue that we need to assume that systems have dispositional prop-
erties in order to understand how part–whole explanations work. 
 As working defi nitions I employ the notions of categorical and dispositional proper-
ties as follows: A dispositional property is a property that, if instantiated by an object, is 
manifest under specifi c conditions only. A categorical property by contrast is a property 
that, if instantiated by an object, is manifest under all conditions. So, according to this 
distinction, categorical properties are limiting cases of dispositional properties. Note: In 
the limiting case of a categorical property, the distinction between a property and its 
manifestation doesn’t do any work. 
 This is certainly not the orthodox way to draw the distinction, but the usual suspects 
fall on the right sides. Solubility and fragility, if instantiated by an object, become mani-
fest under specifi c conditions. On the other hand, triangularity or massiveness (the best 
candidates for categorical properties), if instantiated by an object, are manifest under all 
conditions. 
 Why do we need dispositions to understand part–whole explanations? A basic ingre-
dient of the explanans in a part–whole explanation is the reference to the behaviour the 
parts would manifest if they were on their own. However, this behaviour of the parts is 
not manifest while they are parts of a compound. 
 The vibrating rotator illustrates this: the subsystems contribute to the overall energy 
of the compound. But the behaviour of the subsystems is not manifest. 5 If they were 
manifest, the associated spectral lines could be measured—at least in principle. But they 
can’t. The only spectral lines there are, are those of the compound. 
 The explanation relies on how the parts would behave if they were isolated, i.e. on 
how the rotator would behave if the oscillator were absent. The manifestation of the 
behaviour of the rotator is interfered with by the presence of the oscillator. The oscilla-
tor serves as an antidote with respect to the rotator’s manifestation (and vice versa). It is, 
however, a  partial antidote, because it does not suppress the manifestation completely. It 
prevents (complete) manifestation—however, it allows for  contributing to the behaviour 
of the compound and thus partial manifestation. 
 The behaviour of the falling stone is—in general—not (completely) manifest either, 
because the medium serves as a (partial) antidote. Still, the behaviour of the falling stone 
in the absence of interfering factors plays an essential role in the explanation of the 
behaviour of the compound (falling stone in a medium). 
 5 That is, they are not completely manifest. The distinction between complete and partial manifestation 
will be drawn in the next section. When I talk about manifestation simpliciter this has to be read as  complete 
manifestation rather than partial manifestation (see sect. 2.4). 
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 The description of the temporal evolution of the solar system relies among other 
things on how the parts (the planets and the sun) would behave if they were isolated (the 
kinetic energy terms). That behaviour is, however, not manifest. The other parts or plan-
ets as well as their interactions serve as partial antidotes. 
 To sum up: In part–whole explanations the behaviour of compound systems is 
explained in terms of the behaviour of the parts. The behaviour of these parts is not 
manifest because there are antidotes, namely the other parts or factors. The behaviour 
that we attribute to the parts is thus a behaviour that becomes manifest given certain 
circumstances obtain—the absence of antidotes or disturbing factors. A fortiori, we 
assume that the parts have dispositional properties. Their behaviour is not manifest under 
all circumstances ( see Hüttemann  1998 and  2004 . For a similar argument  see Corry 
 2009 ). 
 2.3 Inertial and quasi-inertial laws 
 The above argument is not an argument for dispositional monism, i.e. the view that  all 
properties are dispositional. I merely claim that at least some of the properties of physical 
systems, namely those appealed to in part–whole explanations, need to be construed as 
dispositional properties. Similarly, the argument does not claim that all laws need to be 
understood in terms of dispositions. According to the argument, those laws that describe 
the behaviour (properties) of systems that can play the role of parts need to be construed 
as attributing dispositions to physical systems. 
 The laws, which went into the explanations we looked at, are laws that describe the 
temporal evolution of systems: the temporal evolution of rotators, oscillators, stones, or 
planets. They describe  processes . The temporal behaviour (or process) that such a law 
describes becomes manifest when there are no disturbing factors or antidotes, as for 
instance the medium or other systems. I will call these laws ‘quasi-inertial laws’ by anal-
ogy to Newton’s fi rst law:
 Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform motion in a straight line, unless it is com-
pelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it. (Newton 1999: 416) 
 The behaviour Newton’s fi rst law attributes to bodies becomes manifest, given nothing 
interferes. My claim is that many law-statements ought to be understood as making 
similar claims. Some temporal behaviour (process) is classifi ed as in some sense ‘inertial’. 
The law-statement says that unless something intervenes, some kind of behaviour will 
become manifest. So in a sense many laws, e.g. Galileo’s law of free fall or the law that 
describes the behaviour of a rotator, can be classifi ed as ‘quasi-inertial’ laws in the fol-
lowing sense: They describe what happens  if nothing intervenes . They describe the  default -
behaviour of a system (or a default process). 
 2.4 Dispositions as contributors 
 The properties we rely on in part–whole explanations are dispositional in the sense 
outlined at the outset: The property/behaviour becomes manifest under special 
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 circumstances only. This is a feature they share (by defi nition) with dispositions we 
come across in everyday situations such as solubility or fragility. However, the dispo-
sitions appealed to in physical part–whole explanations have certain special features, 
which are not in general associated with everyday dispositions. These special features 
are responsible for the fact that my disposition-based theory of causation diff ers sig-
nifi cantly from other dispositionalist accounts of causation (e.g.  Molnar  2003 or 
 Mumford  2009a ). 
 Firstly, as already said, the behaviour appealed to in the part–whole explanations 
under consideration is typically temporal behaviour. The point is not that the manifesta-
tion itself takes time, but rather that the behaviour—when it is manifest—has a temporal 
dimension. It is a process. 
 Secondly, the triggering conditions for the dispositions appealed to are purely nega-
tive. The quasi-inertial behaviour becomes manifest in the  absence of disturbing factors 
(antidotes). 
 Thirdly, the dispositions in question can be  partially manifest; they  contribute to the 
behaviour of the compound. Traditionally it is assumed the following possibilities obtain: 
either (i) a system S has a disposition D and D is manifest; or (ii) S has D, but D fails to be 
manifest; or, fi nally, (iii) S does not have D. In the case of various factors or parts contrib-
uting to a compound, a further situation has to be considered: S has D and D is partially 
manifest, i.e. it is not completely manifest but it contributes. 6 Partial manifestation and 
contribution may appear at fi rst sight to be rather vague terms. This appearance is, how-
ever, deceptive in the case of physical part–whole explanation. It is in virtue of the laws 
of composition that contribution/partial manifestation can be made quantitatively pre-
cise. In our examples it can be made quantitatively precise how the rotator and the oscil-
lator contribute to the compound system; similarly it can be made quantitatively precise 
how the medium aff ects a falling stone. So what I mean by calling dispositions ‘contrib-
utors’ is that the presence of a subsystem’s disposition makes a diff erence to the behav-
iour of the compound and that the diff erence it makes depends on the law of 
composition. 7 
 Let me add that my aim is not to provide a general theory of dispositions but rather to 
characterize those dispositions that we have to postulate in order to understand part–
whole explanations in physics. The characteristics I have just highlighted are thus not to 
be taken to be those of dispositions in general. 
 6 Why is partial manifestation not just a separate set of dispositions that are manifest in cases of non- 
isolation? Answer: That would not explain why it is the  same disposition that is measured in diff erent con-
texts (isolated and non-isolated cases alike). 
 7 The notion of contribution developed here has to be distinguished from that of Molnar. According to 
Molnar, ‘A manifestation is typically a contribution to an eff ect, an eff ect is typically a combination of con-
tributory manifestations’ ( Molnar  2003 : 195). Molnar’s ‘eff ect’ is what I call ‘the behaviour of the com-
pound’; in my terms, the ‘eff ect’ is the manifestation of the dispositions of the compound. As I understand 
it, the contributions/manifestations for Molnar are real entities that mediate between the disposition and the 
overt behaviour (eff ect). I try to get along without such mediating entities. 
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 3 Dispositions as contributors are not causes 
 In the special sciences and in everyday contexts we apply causal terminology.  Prima facie 
it is diffi  cult to see how we could do without. This raises the problem of how to recon-
cile the apparent indispensability of causal talk with Mach’s and Russell’s claims to the 
eff ect that causal statements are incompatible with what physics has to say about the 
world. 
 In section 2 I have argued that physical part–whole  explanations presuppose that the 
properties/behaviours of physical systems that can play the role of parts ought to be 
understood as dispositional properties. One way to go from here is to argue for the thesis 
that causes are dispositions ( Handfi eld  2009 ;  Molnar  2003 ;  Mumford  2009a ). The idea is 
that dispositions cause their manifestations (I take this to be the standard dispositionalist 
account). I will, however, argue that this is a blind alley. While I am not denying that eve-
ryday dispositions such as fragility can be conceived of as causes of their manifestations, 
this move is not possible with regard to the dispositions introduced in section 2. 
 So the claim I am arguing for in this section is: Contribution and causation are diff er-
ent relations and thus not to be identifi ed. Why is this so? 
 There may be cases of simultaneous causation, but the standard causal relation is a 
 temporal determination relation: An  earlier event causes a  later event. Here a  temporal 
determination relation is one in which a property, a state, or an event at  t determines 
another property, state, or event at  t *, with  t *> t (or  t *< t , though I will not consider this 
case). Given this defi nition, the part–whole relation and  a fortiori the relation of contri-
bution is an atemporal relation. The reason is that the laws of composition do not involve 
time. 
 As a consequence, causation (in general) cannot be identifi ed with (reduced to) con-
tribution (i.e. to the relation of a disposition to its manifestation). At best,  simultaneous 
causation (if there is such a thing) can be identifi ed with contribution. So we would 
have a theory for simultaneous (or instantaneous) causation and would need a diff erent 
theory for cases in which the cause precedes the eff ect. 
 But maybe we should conversely consider contribution as a particular kind of (instan-
taneous) causation? The problem here seems to be that the alleged causes and eff ects are 
not in an appropriate way independent. The part–whole relation is constitutive. The 
relevant events, for instance, the rotator contributing to the compound and the com-
pound being in a certain energy state, fail to be  distinct events. It is, however, generally 
accepted that causes and eff ects have to be distinct events (cf.  Lewis  1973 : 165). 8 
 8 Some authors such as  Martin ( 2008 ),  Molnar ( 2003 ), and Munford (2009a) argue that causation does 
not necessarily obtain between distinct events, but is rather a relation between identical events. ‘It is not a 
matter of two events, but of one and the same event—a reciprocal dispositional partnering as a mutual mani-
festing. This surprising identity of what we had dimly thought of as the two-event cause and eff ect loses its 
surprise in the clear light of day’ ( Martin  2008 : 46). There are several diffi  culties connected with this view. 
For our purposes the essential point is that we set out to explain our use of the causal terminology in the 
special sciences and in everyday contexts. This clearly involves that in general, the cause precedes the eff ect 
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 So I conclude that this approach is a blind alley—dispositions (in our sense) do not 
cause their manifestations. It should be stressed that my argument relies essentially on 
the fact that the manifestation of the dispositions I consider is regulated by laws of com-
position, which do not contain a time parameter. It is for this reason that the standard 
dispositionalist account of causation is not tenable in a world as described by physics. 
 4 A disposition-based account of causation 
 We have just seen one attempt to ground the modal force of causes. The idea was to 
identify it with the disposition bringing about its manifestation. We have seen that this 
suggestion does not work. The dispositions in physics are contributors rather than 
causes. 
 More traditionally the modal force of causes (that in virtue of which the cause deter-
mines the eff ect to occur) has been grounded in laws of nature, conceived of as strict 
regularities. There are  laws according to which the cause is a suffi  cient condition for the 
occurrence of the eff ect. As an illustration consider the following simple idealized case: 
Two billiard balls bounce against each other and are refl ected. 
and it is not easy to see how what we called temporal priority in section 1 emerges from Martin’s and related 
accounts. Following Martin et al. would require us to reject a substantial part of the folk conception of 
causation—a rejection that will turn out not to be necessary. 
A A
B
t1 tI t2
B
 Billiard ball A bouncing into B is the cause for B’s defl ection. According to the regularity 
view, the eff ect (B’s defl ection) had to occur in virtue of a regularity according to which 
the cause is a suffi  cient condition for the eff ect to occur. The law or regularity might be 
the following: 
 If at time t 
1
 billiard ball A is at x 
A1
 and has velocity v 
A1
 and B is at x 
B1
 and has v 
B1
 , then 
B at t 
2
 is at x 
B2
 and has v 
B2
 . 
 The problem with this kind of regularity account, as Russell has pointed out, is that 
there are not enough strict regularities. It is always possible that some factor interferes 
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(and as a matter of fact, such things do often happen). As a consequence, the alleged 
cause is not a suffi  cient condition of the occurrence of the alleged eff ect. 
 A second major account of causation is the counterfactual account. It explains how 
the cause partially determines the eff ect (‘partial’ because it allows for interfering fac-
tors): According to the counterfactual account, the cause partially determines the eff ect 
in the sense that if the cause had not occurred, the eff ect would not have occurred 
either. So with respect to the above example, the modal force of the cause is spelled out 
as follows: If at t 
1
 billiard ball A had not been at x 
A1
 with velocity v 
A1
 , B at t 
2
 would not 
have been at x 
B2
 with v 
B2
 . However, there are well-known problems with the counter-
factual account of causation in general and with the account of modal force in particu-
lar. There are cases of causation and  a fortiori of causes determining the eff ects to occur, in 
which the counterfactual conditionals do not hold (pre-emption). 9 
 The challenge is thus to give an account of the modal force of causes that neither runs 
into the problem of interferences nor into the problem of pre-emption. 
 4.1 Central idea 
 The overall aim is to explain why in everyday life and in the special sciences we can suc-
cessfully employ causal terminology despite Mach’s and Russell’s observations, which 
seemed to imply that the concept of causation is incompatible with fundamental phys-
ics. As I already mentioned, in this chapter I will focus on the problem of modal force. 
My account of the modal force of causation will proceed as follows. In a fi rst step I will 
explain how causation and its modal force can be integrated into an idealized world as 
described by physics. In a second step I will explain how this accounts for our ordinary 
applications of causal terminology outside idealized physical models. The essential point 
with respect to the second step is that pragmatic considerations will play an important 
role. Finally, I will discuss some advantages of this view and relate it to other accounts of 
causation. 
 Let me start with a remark by Mach. ‘In general we only feel the need to ask for a 
cause, if a (unexpected) change has occurred’ ( Mach  1896 : 432). Similarly, Hart and 
Honoré have observed:
 The notion, that a cause is essentially something which interferes with or intervenes in the 
course of events which would normally take place, is central to the common-sense concept of 
cause. ( Hart and Honoré  1959 : 27) 
 Apparently, very often what we mean by applying the word ‘cause’ is that a certain factor 
disturbs a  default process of some kind. 10 This observation will be my starting point and I 
will argue that it suffi  ces to give an account of the modal force of causes that is at the 
same time compatible with physics. 
 9 See  Collins et al. ( 2004 ) for a discussion of these problems. 
 10  Maudlin ( 2004 ) and  Menzies ( 2007 ) develop similar ideas. Menzies has also developed an account of 
the kinds of context-sensitivities I discuss in section 5. 
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 Let me return to the simple idealized case: Two billiard balls bounce against each 
other and are refl ected. 
A A
B
t1 tint t2
B
 We take the presence of the ball A at a particular place at t 
int
 as the cause for B’s 
defl ection. 
 If we disregard the problem of asymmetry, we can explain in terms of physics why A’s 
collision with B at t 
Int
 is the cause for B’s defl ection. 
 B behaves according to Newton’s fi rst law, i.e. it has the disposition to simply con-
tinue in a straight line with uniform motion unless there is a disturbing factor. Newton’s 
fi rst law describes the inertial or default behaviour of B. 
 If the default behaviour does not occur, the law tells us that there must be some factor 
that interacted with B. The event of this factor interacting with the default process is the 
cause of the later non-occurrence of the default behaviour. Thus, in the idealized case 
we are considering here, the cause is something that prevents some system’s default 
behaviour to occur.
 In the idealized case under consideration, a cause is an actual disturbing fac-
tor (antidote) to the default behaviour that a system is disposed to display. 
 (I will discuss in sections 5 and 6 how this defi nition has to be augmented in less ideal-
ized cases.) 
 As we have seen, laws are typically quasi-inertial or default laws. They tell us what 
happens if nothing interferes. Defl ections, i.e. deviations from quasi-inertial or default 
behaviour, require an interfering factor—an interaction to have occurred. That is what 
the quasi-inertial laws of physics tell us. Causes are precisely these interfering factors 
that the quasi-inertial laws require in cases of deviations. Causes are thus the antidotes 
that explain why the dispositions that are ascribed by the quasi-inertial laws fail to be 
(completely) manifest. 
 4.2 The origin of the causal counterfactuals 
 We can now explain why typically—though not always—counterfactual conditionals obtain 
according to which if the cause had not occurred, the eff ect would have occurred neither.
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 ~ O ( c )   → ~ O ( e ) (Lewis (1986b): 167). 
 Why is this counterfactual true in many cases of causation? Consider again our simple 
example: 
 My claim is that we hold this counterfactual true in virtue of Newton’s fi rst law: If A 
had not collided with B, B would have taken path b* rather than path b—as it actually 
has (see Figure 2). 
b∗
b
b: B’s actual path
b∗: the path B would have taken if A had not interfered at time tI
B
t1 tI t2
B
 Laws of nature describe how systems would behave in the absence of disturbing fac-
tors, i.e. they attribute dispositions to physical systems. Laws of nature usually describe 
counterfactual situations and should therefore be read as saying, for instance, ‘If the 
hydrogen atom were isolated it would behave according to the Schrödinger equation 
with a Coulomb potential.’ According to my proposal, it is exactly the underlying dispo-
sitions that make true the relevant counterfactuals. So we can understand why in many 
cases of causation, causal counterfactuals are true if we assume that the systems in ques-
tions have the relevant dispositions ( see Hüttemann  2004 : 110–15). 
 4.3 Pre-emption and interference 
 I promised an account of causation that does not run into the problems of interference 
and pre-emption. So how are these problems evaded? 
 As is well known, sometimes backup causes may be around. We do think that backup 
causes do not undermine causation. However, they undermine counterfactual depend-
ence. Since according to our account causation is not identifi ed with counterfactual 
dependence, there is no problem of (either early or late) pre-emption. Counterfactual 
dependence is not necessary for causation. For this solution of the pre-emption problem 
it is essential that the cause, i.e. the occurrence of the disturbing factor or antidote, can 
be spelled out in terms of  actual facts about interactions rather than in terms of counter-
factual claims about what would have happened if the factor in question had been 
absent. All that is needed for singular causation is the disposition of a system to behave 
according to a (quasi-)inertial law and the  actual disturbing factor. The presence of  poten-
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tial disturbing factors is irrelevant on the account presented here ( see Maudlin ( 2004 ) 
for a similar approach). 
 How does our account evade the interference problem? After all, laws play quite a 
signifi cant role in our account. The main move is to understand laws as ascriptions of 
dispositions rather than as strict regularities concerning manifest behaviour. Newton’s 
fi rst law is not a strict regularity concerning manifest behaviour. It is no strict regularity 
because in fact there are often (maybe always) interfering factors around (impressed 
forces). However, strict regularities are not needed for our account. All that we need for 
our account of causation are laws based on dispositions that tell us what would happen if 
nothing disturbs the default behaviour. The problem of interferences does not apply. 
 5 Causal fi elds 
 The example we have considered so far was highly idealized. Relative to this idealized 
setting a cause was defi ned as a disturbing factor to the default behaviour that a system is 
disposed to display. The situation was idealized because we have abstracted away from 
diverse factors. In non-idealized situations there are always further interference factors 
besides what we identify as ‘the cause’, e.g. the molecules in the air collide with the bil-
liard ball in question. Furthermore, certain constitutive conditions obtain, such as the 
presence of the billiard-ball table. 
 John Mackie has described this as the  causal fi eld :
 Both cause and eff ect are seen as diff erences within a fi eld; anything that is part of the assumed 
(but commonly unstated) description of the fi eld itself will, then, be automatically ruled out as 
a candidate for the role of cause. ( Mackie  1980 : 35) 
 It is for instance taken for granted that the gravitational fi eld is stable, the history of the 
universe is kept fi xed, etc. It is only relative to these and other background assumptions 
that a default process can be defi ned. If, for example, the billiard-ball table had not been 
smooth but bumpy, and if this were part of the background assumptions (causal fi eld), 
the default process would have been diff erent. 
 It is important to notice that in one and the same situation diff erent people may make 
diff erent assumptions about the background. In a case of a car accident one observer 
might take the dirt on the street as part of the background. The default process in this 
case might be that the car starts to skid slightly and that the driver is able to stabilize the 
car afterwards. The cause for the accident is the driver’s drunkenness and his/her inabil-
ity to control the car in diffi  cult circumstances. Someone else might take the drunken-
ness of the driver as part of the background conditions. The default process is the driver 
driving the car home safely (provided no diffi  cult situations occur). In this case the dirt 
on the street is the cause of the accident. 
 What counts as a quasi-inertial or default process and what counts as a cause will be 
determined relative to a causal fi eld and thus relative to pragmatic or subjective con-
cerns. However, this relativity does not imply that quasi-inertial processes are arbitrary. 
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If one has chosen a particular fi eld, whether or not a certain process is an inertial process 
is an objective matter. If the smoothness of the billiard-ball table is part of the causal 
fi eld, it is no longer a subjective matter whether the default process of the billiard ball 
consists in a uniform and rectilinear motion rather than in some kind of non-uniform 
motion. 
 To sum up: An augmented defi nition of ‘cause’ has to take the causal fi eld into 
account:
 Relative to a causal fi eld, a cause is an actual disturbing factor (antidote) to 
the default behaviour that a system is disposed to display. 
 The introduction of causal fi elds allows us to explain some of the features that are usu-
ally associated with the causal relation. 
 First, it allows to distinguish between causes and conditions. The smoothness of the 
billiard-ball table (as part of the causal fi eld) is a mere condition of the deviation of ball 
B, whereas the interaction with A is its cause. 
 Second, it allows causes to be local. While it may be true that the conjunction of all 
relevant factors for a certain event is non-local in the sense that an indefi nite environ-
ment has to be taken into account, the introduction of the causal fi eld allows to relegate 
the environment to the fi eld. Thus, the intuition that causes are local can be respected. 
 It is, however, a consequence of this conception that whether or not a particular event 
is considered to be part of the causal fi eld—and thus a condition rather than a cause—is 
a matter of pragmatic and subjective concerns. Whether or not an event is a cause is thus 
not an entirely objective fact. This consequence seems, however, to capture how we 
actually employ causal terminology (as illustrated in the case of the car accident). Objec-
tivity seems to be an issue where the folk-conception and the actual use of the termi-
nology point in diff erent directions. 
 6 Limiting conditions 
 What we have shown is that—given our conception of causation—causal terminology 
is applicable in certain cases (such as the billiard ball example). However, we have no 
guarantee that the terminology is generally applicable. 
 I would like to suggest that causal terminology is applicable given that certain limit-
ing conditions obtain, but that it might not be applicable in other cases. 11  What are 
these limiting conditions? 
 In some compound systems (such as the system consisting of the two interacting bil-
liard balls) we can identify two subsystems and their default behaviour (because they are 
isolated prior to their interaction and afterwards), as well as their spatio-temporally 
localized interaction. If these conditions are met, the application of the causal terminol-
 11 Dennis Dieks has developed similar ideas in his dissertation ( Dieks  1981 , chap. 3). For a recent articula-
tion of this strategy  see Norton  2007 . 
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ogy is plausible. In other words: As long as the (compound) system we are investigating 
can reasonably be described as having the ‘two colliding billiard balls’-structure (local-
ized interaction, isolated systems prior to and after the interaction), causal terminology 
is applicable. 
 While the above-mentioned conditions are suffi  cient for the application of causal 
terminology, they do not seem to be necessary. For instance, in real cases, to which we 
apply causal terminology, the disturbed systems are never completely isolated. The bil-
liard balls collide with molecules in the air, the moon exerts a gravitational pull, etc. 
Some of these factors can be relegated to the causal fi eld while others are simply 
neglected. Thus, classifying certain interfering factors as negligible is a further pragmatic 
aspect that is presupposed by the application of causal terminology. 
 Furthermore, the interaction we considered in the billiard-ball case was local (colli-
sion). That seems not to be a necessary condition for the applicability of causal termi-
nology. Consider the following case: 
 A compound system consisting of a large massive system A and small massive system 
B that is defl ected: 
A
B
 Let us assume that A simply sits there and by gravitational attraction defl ects the path of 
B. Even though the interaction is not local, we would still say that the gravitational 
potential generated by A is the cause of B’s path being defl ected. The interaction is 
always on and thus B never actually instantiates the default or quasi-inertial behaviour. 
Still, since in this situation B approaches inertial behaviour if it is very distant from A, we 
can understand why in this case causal terminology is applicable. In this case the essen-
tial point seems to be that we have theoretical and/or experimental means on the basis 
of which we can attribute a certain default behaviour to B that is then disturbed by A. 
 In the end there may not be a clear-cut line that distinguishes cases in which the 
terms ‘cause’ and ‘eff ect’ are applicable from those in which they are not. There are, how-
ever, clear cases. We have come across systems to which the causal terminology is clearly 
applicable. On the other hand, there are, for example, closed deterministic systems with 
nothing remotely similar to the billiard-ball structure. They seem to be clear candidates 
where the application of causal terminology is inappropriate. It was these cases that 
Russell had in mind:
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 The law of gravitation will illustrate what occurs in any advanced science. In the motions of 
mutually gravitating bodies, there is nothing that can be called an eff ect; there is merely a 
formula. Certain diff erential equations can be found, which hold at every instant for every 
particle of the system, and which, given the confi gurations and the velocities at one instant, 
or the confi gurations at two instants, render the confi guration at any other earlier or later 
instant calculable. That is to say, the confi guration at any instant is a function of that instant 
and the confi gurations at two given instants. [. . .]. But there is nothing that could be properly 
called ‘cause’ and nothing that could properly be called ‘eff ect’ in such a system. ( Russell 
 1912 –13: 14) 
 Russell’s claim was of course meant not only to apply to this special case. However, as we 
have seen, there are limiting conditions such that the application of causal terminology 
is plausible. The limiting condition we have identifi ed is this: It must be plausible to 
attribute default behaviour to a subsystem of a compound and to identify a disturbing 
factor for the deviation of the default behaviour. And this does indeed often seem to be 
case, at least relative to certain pragmatic considerations. 
 7 Relation to other process-theories 
 I argued that the application of causal terminology can be best understood if a cause is 
taken to be an actual disturbing factor (antidote) to the default behaviour that a system is 
disposed to display (relative to a causal fi eld). This is a claim about processes, because the 
default behaviour concerns the temporal evolution of a system (e.g. the process that is 
described in Newton’s fi rst law). So how exactly is the disposition-based view related to 
traditional process-theories? 
 Process-theories tend to take ‘causation to be the transfer or persistence of properties 
of a specifi c sort’ ( Dowe  2009 : 214). The default processes we have talked about can 
indeed be characterized in terms of the persistence of properties: The behaviour in 
question is persistently manifest as long as nothing intervenes. Process-theories consider 
interferences with these processes as cases of causation. Thus far I agree. There are two 
important disagreements: First, I do not take the processes themselves to constitute cau-
sation. A statue being at a certain place at 2 p.m. today is not a cause of its being there at 
5 p.m.—even though it may be a condition. Therefore, I do not talk about  causal proc-
esses but rather about  default processes. Second, the characterization of the relevant 
processes and disturbances (interactions) is diff erent. Whereas Dowe and Salmon char-
acterize these processes either by the mark-criterion or in terms of invariant or con-
served quantities ( Dowe  2009 provides an overview), I characterize them in terms of 
the underlying systems’ dispositions. A ball rolling on a fl at surface is classifi ed by tradi-
tional process-theorists as a causal process because it conserves kinetic energy and 
momentum. I characterize it as a default process, because it manifests a disposition, 
namely the one that is attributed in Newton’s fi rst law. Having certain invariant/con-
served physical properties is thus not necessary to qualify as a default process. The essen-
tial question is whether or not the relevant system has a certain disposition. It is for the 
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physicists to decide whether or not bodies have the disposition to continue in uniform 
rectilinear motion if no forces are impressed. Similarly it is for economists to decide 
whether or not (within a certain causal fi eld) an economic system in which infl ation 
rises will yield higher unemployment rates (if nothing interferes). 
 As a consequence whether or not something qualifi es as a default process need not be 
spelled out in terms of physics. To the extent that biology or economics attributes dispo-
sitions to systems that concern their temporal evolution, these disciplines are dealing 
with biological or economical default processes. 
 Similarly, what qualifi es as a disturbance of a default process needs to be spelled out in 
terms of physics. I want to leave room for various kinds of disturbances that have to be 
specifi ed locally. It is the job of the sciences in question to provide a more detailed 
description of the disturbance. While physics considers a certain repertoire of distur-
bance factors that can be described in terms of physical interaction or, maybe, conserved 
quantities, economy considers state interventions, decisions of the Federal Reserve 
Bank, or natural catastrophes. 
 The disposition-based process-theory thus promises to take account of the fact that 
causal relations may obtain on various ‘levels’. 
 A further advantage of the disposition-based process-theory vis-à-vis traditional 
process-theories is its ability to cope with double prevention cases. Ned Hall has 
described a paradigm case:
 Suzy is piloting a bomber on a mission to blow up an enemy target, and Billy is piloting a fi ghter 
as her lone escort. Along comes an enemy fi ghter plane, piloted by Enemy. Sharp-eyed Billy 
spots Enemy, zooms in, pulls the trigger, and Enemy’s plane goes down in fl ames. Suzy’s mission 
is undisturbed, and the bombing takes place as planned. ( Hall  2004 : 241) 
 We want to say that Billy’s pulling the trigger is a cause of the bombing of the target. 
Traditional process-theories have a problem with this example because there is no 
continuous physical process leading from Billy’s pulling the trigger to the actual 
bombing. 
 Here is how the situation can be described given the disposition-based process-
theory: 
 Let’s start with the simple case. Suzy’s bombing being the cause for the destruction of 
the target. Here the  target sitting around peacefully is the default process that is disturbed. 
Second case: If Enemy would prevent Suzy from bombing the target, we consider  Suzy 
bombing the target as the default process that is disturbed by Enemy’s intervention. So, 
Enemy’s intervention is the cause of the target’s survival. Third, if Billy shoots down 
Enemy, the default process we are considering is  Enemy preventing Suzy from bombing the 
target . This process is disturbed by Billy’s pulling the trigger. Billy’s pulling the trigger is 
therefore the cause that  Enemy preventing Suzy from bombing the target does not take place 
and thus a cause of the bombing of the target. 
 So the disposition-based process-theory is able to cope with at least some objections 
to traditional process-theories. 
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 8 Probabilistic causation 
 One might wonder how the account outlined so far is relevant for causal claims in the 
special sciences, since many of these are probabilistic causal claims. Probabilistic causal 
claims such as ‘Smoking causes lung-cancer’ are typically type-level causal claims in 
contrast to the token-level claims I have considered so far. Thus the question is whether 
and how probabilistic causal type-level claims fi t into the picture outlined so far. 
 There are two diff erent ways in which the truth of such claims may depend on under-
lying processes and disturbances, depending on whether the underlying processes are 
deterministic or genuinely indeterministic.
 (1) Deterministic case: The probabilistic type-level claim obtains in virtue of coarse 
graining over diff erent kinds of diff erent causings. Suppose the claim is that 
some event type X probabilistically causes Y to occur. This may be true in virtue 
of the fact that two diff erent kinds of situations are involved:
 situation type A: X disturbs process P, Y occurs as a result of ensuing process P*. 
 situation type B: X disturbs process P, X* disturbs ensuing process P*, Y does not 
occur. 
 Coarse graining over heterogeneous situations of type A and type B makes probabilistic 
type-level claims true. If Pr (Y|X) > Pr(Y) one might say that X is likely to cause Y. In 
this deterministic case no new element has to be introduced in order to understand 
probabilistic causal claims at the type-level. 
 The situation is diff erent if one wants to accept genuine chancy causation:
 (2) Indeterministic case: The probabilistic type-level claim obtains in virtue of genuine 
chancy causation. Suppose the chance of receiving a certain illness I is 0.5 per cent. 
Excessive consumption of X raises the probability to 2 per cent. We furthermore 
assume that the relevant type-level claim ‘Excessive consumption of X  causes I’ can-
not be explained in terms of coarse-graining over heterogeneous situations. This 
case requires the introduction of genuinely indeterministic processes, i.e. processes 
that have various outcomes and a probability distribution over the outcomes. It 
might be the case that human beings (in the usual contexts) develop illness I in 0.5 
per cent of the cases and non-I (i.e. fail to develop I) in 99.5 per cent of the cases. 
Take this to be the default process. I take it that x is the cause of i (lower case for 
instantiations of types) if the person in question excessively consumes x, if the per-
son furthermore develops I, and if the original probability distribution changes in 
virtue of the consumption of x such that it is more likely to develop I. 
 Genuine chancy causation (at the token level) can then be understood as follows:
 x causes i, if x occurs, i occurs, and the default process probability distribution has 
been disturbed by x so that Pr (I/X)>Pr(I) is true. 
 The central idea is that genuinely indeterministic processes have a probability distribu-
tion over outcomes, which might be disturbed by interfering factors. If the disturbance 
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raises the probability of the outcome, then the interfering factor may be said to have 
caused a certain outcome. This is an extension of the original account to the case of 
chancy causation. There are certain well-known diffi  culties with the probability raising 
requirement (see e.g.  Hitchcock  2011 ); however, I hope the sketch suffi  ces to indicate 
how genuine chancy causation may be adumbrated. 
 Probabilistic causal type-level claims in the special sciences may thus be true in virtue 
of underlying disturbances of deterministic processes or in virtue of disturbances of 
indeterministic processes or both. 
 9 The origin of causal modality 
 In this chapter I have argued that causation can be explained in terms of laws that 
describe default processes and that these laws should be understood in terms of 
 dispositions. What does that tell us about the origin of causal modality or causal 
determination? 
 In the case of the billiard balls the origin of this determination becomes apparent if 
we consider the situation as the behaviour of a compound system. What is relevant in 
this case is the law of the conservation of momentum. A’s state and the law of the con-
servation of momentum determine how B behaves. 
 More generally: The law for the compound system (plus the states of the other parts) 
determine the eff ect, i.e. the behaviour of the part that is disturbed. 
 The modal force or determination is thus due to those laws that determine the behav-
iour of the compound system. 
 (N) The eff ect occurs necessarily because the compound system manifests its behav-
iour necessarily. 
 But what kind of necessity is involved here? 
 Let me present a somewhat speculative sketch that provides an answer to this ques-
tion. In what follows I take metaphysical necessity to be necessity that obtains in virtue 
of the essence of a system. So if a system has a certain property with metaphysical neces-
sity it has it in virtue of its essence. Now let us assume that the systems we are consider-
ing have their dispositions essentially. This will not yet give us the explanation of the 
modal force or determination we are looking for (N). 
 The essential point is that two issues have to be distinguished:
 a) the claim that an object or property has a disposition necessarily (dispositional 
essentialism) and 
 b) the claim that a disposition displays its manifestation necessarily. 
 Dispositional essentialism (a) does not explain why the dispositions in question manifest 
their behaviour necessarily. In fact, they don’t. As long as antidotes are possible, manifes-
tation cannot occur with necessity, i.e. it is still not clear what kind of necessity is involved 
in (N) (for a discussion of these points see  Schrenk  2010 ). 
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 A possible solution to this problem is the following: What happens if the compound 
(consisting of the disturbed system and the interferer) is itself disturbed, is determined by 
the disposition(s) of this compound, the disposition(s) of the new interference factor as well 
as the law(s) of composition. Now assume that it is part of the  essence of systems that they 
behave according to the laws of composition. Then the following holds: It is necessarily the 
case that, if nothing interferes, the compound system manifests its behaviour. It is further-
more necessarily the case that, if something interferes, the system displays a diff erent behav-
iour of this or that kind. In other words, if we assume that the laws of composition hold with 
metaphysical necessity, then the manifestation of the dispositions of the systems happens 
with conditional metaphysical necessity. The conditions in question are the disturbing fac-
tors. So it holds with metaphysical necessity that—if nothing interferes—billiard ball A 
defl ects billiard ball B. The modal force of causes obtains in virtue of the essence of the sys-
tems involved. The necessity involved in (N) is conditional metaphysical necessity. 
 The assumption of conditional metaphysical necessity allows us to give a unifi ed 
account of dispositional, nomological, and causal modalities. It is conditional metaphys-
ical necessity that is at work in all of these cases. If the systems have not only their dispo-
sitions essentially but furthermore conform to the laws of composition in virtue of their 
essence, then, fi rst, with metaphysical necessity—if nothing interferes—the disposition 
becomes manifest. Second, with metaphysical necessity—if nothing interferes—the law 
that attributes the disposition in question is true. And, third, with metaphysical neces-
sity—if nothing interferes—the disposition of compound systems such as the system 
consisting of the two billiard balls becomes manifest, i.e. with metaphysical necessity—
given the right conditions—the cause determines the eff ect. 
 10 Conclusion 
 To sum up: I have asked in this chapter how and under what circumstances causal termi-
nology can be applied to the physical world. The focus was the question how to under-
stand that the cause determines the eff ect to occur (I disregarded the problem of the 
asymmetry of causation). I argued that we should conceive a cause as an actual disturb-
ing factor (antidote) to the default process that a system is disposed to display (relative to 
a causal fi eld). Given this disposition-based process-theory we can understand how cau-
sation is part of the physical world. We can furthermore understand how causation can 
have many of the features that the folk-conception of causation associates with it: modal 
force, locality, the distinction between causes and conditions, and the multi-level char-
acter of causation. The idea that whether or not something is a cause (as opposed to a 
condition) is an objective matter could not be vindicated. It should also be stressed, that 
causal terminology is only applicable given certain limiting conditions that need to be 
realized by all kind of (physical) systems.  12 
 12 I would like to thank two anonymous referees, the audience in Nottingham, the members of the DFG-
funded Research Group FOR 1063 on  Causation and Explanation , as well as John Roberts for their very 
helpful comments on an earlier version of this chapter. 
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